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NPT-CTBT AND INDIA’S OPTIONS: A DISARMAMENT DILEMMA
MAJ GEN(Dr )ANIL LAL VATS(Retd)
India will have to gear up to face the challenge of the outcome of the NPT review conference scheduled at the CD in May 2010. The pressure for sighning both the NPT and thereafter the CTBT is bound to reach a critical mass beyond India’s interest. Not signing any treaty at all is no more an option today. India therefore, should either carry out minimum tests, collect independent data and simultaneously sign on the dotted lines or otherwise acquiesce and just sign and maybe collect data through goodwill or at best, by a sub-critical test
Backdrop
The recent concluded Nuclear Security Summit at Washington was attended by Heads of State of 47 countries. There was an unanimous decision concerning Nuclear Materials Safety and the risk of their falling into the hands of terrorists and the dangers thereafter.
Disarmament is a philosopher’s dream, but a soldier’s dilemma, as invariably treaties are just papers, to disarm, deceive and deny the weak. A broad historical analysis traces the roots of disarmament to Mahabharata times - and to the 6th century B.C. when the Chinese conference on disarmament was held. There is a long history of mala in se prohibitions (which are a form of qualitative arms limitation). According to book of ‘Manu’ the ancient Hindus outlawed use of barbed, poisonous and flaming projectiles which is a form of disarmament and arms control. Since then attempts have been male to outlaw crossbows - submarines - missiles and nuclear weapons. This century has seen two world wars. A pattern analysis depicts the proliferation of such treaties in the post second world war period and especially during the cold war period between 1970-1990, when more than 15 disarmament related treaties have been initiated, some of which India has been constrained to sign may be due to the interplay in the current South Asian calculus and the bellicosity of the three recalcitrant states in the region. Therefore to have a macro view of disarmament related issues it becomes imperative to analyse the dominant factors like security perceptions, in relation to deterrence, disarmament, and just wars. Even the danger of an accidental war have to be offset by confidence building measures (CBM) and such like actions.
I would like to share a few thoughts on the modus vivendi and the complexity of disarmament and deterrence. Mark Twain once observed that, “For every complex and difficult problem there is always a simple and easy solution and it is always wrong”; simple and easy solutions can seem effective temporarily, but they usually manage to leave the real problem unsolved. Disarmament falls in this category as they look simplistic but are very complex negotiations. To understand them there is a case for studying the relationship between arms control, disarmament and the strategy of defence; as treaties stimulate, ban or restrict development or deployment and may work at cross purposes to the detriment of national security. However, unilateral disarmers believe modern weapons are so dangerous that global security has supplanted national security as a requisite. Therefore nations have to decide military preparations not based on unilateralism nor militarism but a pragmatic analysis of the threat perception and the level of deterrence so required. So is India’s case.
I would also like to magnify the relationship between nuclear deterrence and arms control per se, as is relevant today in the Indian sub-continent. As a general concept, deterrence is relatively simple. Yet it becomes a complicated issue when applied to the specific situations (like in J&K) or the US strategy in Afghanistan. Deterrence depends on human perceptions, which are subject to interference from emotions like hope and fear and on their credibility and stability. A stable deterrence should become the genesis for disarmament. However this may not be the case in the Indian sub-continent. I would like to quote “when the axe is blunt and has not first been sharpened, then one must use more force”. Therefore India has no option but to be prepared and thus deal with disarmament theories appropriately. In the end, with special reference to our environment, one cannot forget what Kautilya said “Balance of Power between States should deter wars” and one can carry it forward to say that half baked disarmament treaties can only be broken as it is very difficult to predict, what kind of weapons should be controlled or limited by mutual agreement. Therefore India’s age old stand of total nuclear disarmament is actually a pragmatic and even approach to world peace. It is worth quoting the parable of the animal’s disarmament conference:
“The eagle, with an eye on the bull, suggested that all horns be razed off. The bull, with a squint at the tiger, thought that all claws should be cut short. The tiger, glaring at the elephant, was of the opinion that tusks should be pulled out or at any rate shortened. The elephant, staring at the eagle, thought it indispensable that all wings should be clipped. Whereupon the bear, with a circular glance at all his brethren, cried out: “Why all those half-way measures? Let all weapons be done away with, so that nothing remains in the way of a fraternal, all embracing hug.”
The NPT Review Conference is due in May 2010 and US has already made way for coercing nations for signing the CTBT. The disarmament debate now strikes a moral and ethical chord as well. Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a flurry of international, multilateral and bilateral agreements. The process turned into a cascade in the post Cold World period. Unfortunately, none of these have addressed the basic issues that cause war. None have succeeded in banishing nuclear weapons. The agreements are basically collateral in nature - these aspire to a nuclear weapons free world in a distant future while maintaining the hegemony of the nuclear haves for the time being.
Since 1950s, there have been efforts to limit nuclear testing and this resulted in a series of treaties like the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963 (PTBT) which disallowed testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 1974 (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 1976 (PNET) - both these treaties between USA and USSR restricted underground nuclear tests to 150 KT yield. Consensus was then built up for a comprehensive ban resulting in the genesis of the CTBT.
Besides, it must be realised that no other nuclear weapon country has perfected the nuclear weaponisation by conducting less than at least 50 nuclear tests. If India has to have a credible nuclear deterrence, it should have at least 250 to 300 nuclear weapons ,for a two front war scenario.(If numbers do not count then why did the recent US-Russia treaty has only reduced 1/3 of deployed weapons.)and that goal cannot be achieved by foreclosing nuclear tests for all time to come. Of course, further tests could be avoided if our scientists get the required expertise and data by conducting what are called sub-critical tests. (Although its full efficacy is a debatable point). But that is an option, which should remain with India, not dictated by others.
What’s next?
The next Review Conference will meet from 4–15 May 2010 in New York. Some of the items likely to be considered for review could be: entry into force of the CTBT, commencement of negotiations of a fissile materials treaty and universalisation of the treaty; as well as the issue of signing by Annexure 2 states before the treaty enters into force. That means India and some other recent unrecognized nuclear weapon states have to sign, before the treaty enters into force. (This clause has been added to pin down India etc.)
Meanwhile, the US is going to set the stage by leading upfront and, attempt ratifying the CTBT. This then, will apply pressure on the non-signatories, (like India) both for signing the NPT and the CTBT. The dialectics of the CTBT diplomacy needs a mention here. Without doubt, Senate ratification of the CTBT is perhaps the most credible way President Obama can signal the U.S. commitment to Article VI of the NPT. Within the context of the NPT, the CTBT has been inextricably linked to both the indefinite extension of the treaty and nuclear disarmament. In 1995, the NPT was indefinitely extended as part of a package deal, which stipulated that CTBT negotiations were to be completed at the Conference on Disarmament "no later than" 1996.The 2000 NPT Review Conference named the early entry into force of the CTBT as the first of the 13 "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." U.S. CTBT ratification would legitimise international support for its wider nonproliferation goals. Failure to win ratification, on the other hand, would expose the Obama administration in undercutting the president's efforts to reinforce the nonproliferation regime. The administration faces an uphill climb to win Senate ratification. To be sure, all 58 Democratic Senators, as well as the two Independents, are expected to vote in favor of the treaty. On the other hand, given that treaty ratification requires consent from two-thirds of the Senate, if the Treaty were resubmitted to the Senate this year, at least seven Republican senators would have to be persuaded to vote in favor of the CTBT. The opposition includes certain Senators, who are rigid vocal critics of the CTBT(They had led the effort to defeat the treaty in 1999).Unfortunately, for Obama, the current Republican Whip, has considerably more influence now, than he did when the CTBT last came up for a vote.
Indian Perspective
If Obama’s effort fails then India may get a breather. From India’s current perspective of being almost marginalised in Afghanistan and that Obama calling China to play the role of stabilizer in Asia and South Asia, leads one to a very important deduction, that US will apply all possible leverage to make India sign the NPT followed by the CTBT. In fact the Indo-US treaty operationalisation process has enough leverage against India. For instance, Japan is refusing to give sensitive nuclear technology to France, who is putting nuclear energy plants in India. till India does not sign the NPT. Here it appears as if the Indo-US Nuclear Treaty is now already being applied as leverage against India, rather than India being given a special status of being considered as a de-facto nuclear state.
The proposed CTBT that the Obama administration is keen to revive and conclude is an affront to India’s sovereignty. Because, the text of the CTBT is unprecedented in an international treaty, since Article XIV of the CTBT contains a peculiar entry-into-force clause, which says that the CTBT must get the approval of 42 countries, including India, Pakistan and Israel, even though they do not believe in it. As Arundhati Ghose, India’s former permanent representative at Geneva, had once remarked,’ Which country would accept a situation after it has declared its dissatisfaction and, therefore, its decision not to sign, much less, ratify a particular treaty, finds that it is forced by other countries which accept the treaty to sign and ratify it despite being against national interest or else face unspecified measures?’ This has to be considered against the strategic backdrop of an emanating two front threat, which has not only been articulated by the Army Chief but also by the erstwhile NSA, Shri Brijesh Mishra of the BJP. If India’s nuclear weapons growth is stunted at this stage, it is bound to curtail India’s strategic autonomy in times to come.
Sovereignty of nation-states will require a re-look. It is horrifying to imagine a situation when, for instance, there will be an international treaty demanding India’s or any nations obedience on many international issues... But then, that could become a reality with the likes of the CTBT being around. The other view, of India acquiescing and signing the treaty as a goodwill measure will be a repeated error like giving 90,000 prisoners to Pakistan after the 1971 war or declaring Tibet to be a part of China in the 1950s.
India should therefore weigh options to meet national interest in the long run. May be India can take the middle course and carry out at least five to ten tests and then simultaneously sign the CTBT, followed suite by signing the NPT under a clause of including India in the cosy P-5 club, amended to read as P-5+.
In finality, the message is clear that India will have to seek its own strength by creating its own nuclear explosion data. Because, the basic fact is, that no amount of simulation can capture actual live data that emanates after a true explosion. In fact the basic data so collected, from these tests can actually assist in more realistic simulation in future , as well as depict, that India has the will to become a global power, despite all odds .Not signing, any of the two treaties is actually no option today, at all.
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Maj Gen Anil Lal Vats is a former Director NBC Warfare and Fellow IDSA. He has done doctorate in Defence Studies and authored the book ‘Nuclear Strategy and Disarmament’. He is holding the Cariappa Chair of Excellence at the USI of India.
